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RES JUDICATA IN FEDERAL TAX CASES
ERWIN N. GRISWOLDt
Res judicata facit ex albo nigrum, ex nigro
album, ex' curvo rectum, ex recto curvum.
A WEAPON which makes white black and straightens curves would
seem to be a useful item in the armament of any lawyer, perhaps es-
pecially of a tax lawyer. Yet it is always possible for a bludgeon to
miss its mark. And it should not be surprising to find that the use of
the undiscriminating instrument of res judicata in tax litigation may
sometimes result in neither black nor white, nor straightened lines. It
is the purpose of this article to examine the extent to which res judicata
has found application in the tax field and to attempt some evaluation
of the doctrine as an aid in the disposition of tax controversies.'
Res judicata is a sort of estoppel, in the sense that it forecloses ef-
fective assertion of or investigation into the truth. In this guise it has
sometimes been elaborately subdivided into estoppel by judgment, estoppel
by verdict, the rule against splitting causes of action, and so on.2 While
these classifications are a recognition that the problem has many aspects,
the term res judicata is used broadly here to indicate any situation in
which a judgment or decision rendered in one proceeding is for any
reason given conclusive effect in subsequent litigation.
The problem may be posed- and a background laid by stating the two
principal tax cases in which the principle of res judicata has been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court: one a case of four years' standing, the
other decided within recent months. The first of these, Tait v. Western
Maryland Railway,' presented the issue whether the taxpayer might
deduct for the years 1920 through 1925 an amortized proportion of
the discount on bonds sold by a predecessor company. In a previous
case, the Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the same taxpayer
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1. The consideration is confined almost solely to federal tax cases, though the dan-
ger of this is recognized. See Griswold, Book Review (1935) 48 HAtv. L. REv. 1032,
1034; PAUL, STUDIES ir FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) iii, 66. Courts and the Board of Tax
Appeals have drawn little on non-tax authorities in res judicata cases. For state cases
on the problems here discussed see Comments (1933) 33 COL. L. Rxv. 1404, (1933) 46
HARv. L. REv. 692. See also 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 851-52.
There is a brief discussion of the present questions in Paul, Res Judicata in Federal
Taxation (1937) 15 TAX MAG. 260.
2. See generally von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 299.
3. 289 U. S. 620 (1933).
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might make the deduction for the years 1918 and 1919.' The Supreme
Court held that the earlier decision was res judicata,' and that it fore-
closed any consideration of the merits of the controversy.' In reaching
this result the Court rejected the contention that res judicata was inap-
plicable because the formal parties on behalf of the Government in the
two cases were different. It also held that the first judgment was bind-
ing, although it was based in part on a stipulation, and although evidence
contrary to this stipulation was offered in the second proceeding. "The
very right now contested arising out of the same facts appearing in
this record, was adjudged in the prior proceeding."'
In the more recent Supreme Court case, Blair v. Commissioner,8 the
ultimate question was who should be taxed for the income of a trust.
The taxpayer was a beneficiary under a trust instrument providing that
the trust income should be paid to the beneficiaries "directly upon their
separate order and receipt therefor," and that the income should not be
"subject to the payment of the debts or obligations" of the beneficiaries.
In 1923, the taxpayer executed a series of instruments assigning various
portions of the trust income to his children, and the assigned income
was thereafter paid directly to the assignees. The Commissioner, never-
theless, assessed all of the income to the taxpayer for the year 1923;
and this action was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the
ground that the trust was a spendthrift trust and that consequently the
income was unassignable. While this case was going through the courts,
the Commissioner determined deficiencies on the same ground for sev-
eral succeeding years, and the taxpayer filed petitions with the Board
of Tax Appeals. Thereafter, the trustees of the trust, of whom the tax-
payer was one, joined the other beneficiaries as parties in a proceeding
4. Western Maryland Ry. v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929),
rev'g, 12 B. T. A. 889 (1928).
5. The conclusiveness of the prior decision vs thought to follow from New Or-
leans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371 (1897), where a similiar result had been reached
with respect to a state property tax. The decision in United States . Stone & Downer
Co., 274 U. S. 225 (1927), that res judicata was inapplicable to decisions of the Court
of Customs Appeals, was distinguished on the ground of the long continued practice
of that Court at a time when its jurisdiction was final.
6. Whether a corporation not enjoying the benefits of res judicata may deduct
amortized discounts on a predecessor's bonds, is not yet entirely clear. Cf. New York
Cent. R. R. v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. dcnied, 296 U. S.
653 (1935); American Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 85 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936); Coast Counties Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 1199 (1936),
(1936) 46 YALE L. J. 314.
7. 289 U. S. 620, 626 (1933). A similar effort to show different facts in the second
case failed in Leininger v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
8. 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937). The case is also discussed at pp. 1344-45, infra.
9. Commissioner v. Blair, 60 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), cert. denied, 238
U. S. 602 (1933).
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in the Illinois courts, seeking a construction of the trust instrument and
a determination of the validity of the assignments. The action resulted
in an opinion of the state court that the trust restrained alienation only
at the suit of creditors; and the assignments were held valid.1" This
decision was then presented to the Board in the second tax controversy;
and the Supreme Court ultimately held that the first decision was not res
judicata, although it was a case between the same parties and on the
same issue, namely, the validity of the assignments. But the subsequent
decision of the Illinois Appellate Court was held to be conclusive against
the Government, although the Government was not a party to it.
Here, then, are two decisions on the effect of a prior adjudication in
a tax controversy when the same question is presented in a subsequent
tax case. In one, the prior tax decision was held to be res judicata; in
the other, it was not. This much the two decisions have in common:
Both went against the Government. In this, at least, res judicata appears
to be different from other forms of estoppel, which so far have operated
almost invariably against the interests of the taxpayer.1 ' The two cases,
too, are sufficient to show that res judicata is a very slippery concept, no
less puzzling to apply in actual cases than are some of the other for-
mulae of the law. Under such circumstances, these cases, though deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, cannot be regarded as fixed points. With
them as a background, however, we may undertake to survey the deci-
sions which the courts and the Board have rendered in the field.
I. THE TRIBUNAL
As a first question, we may ask: What sort of decisions have that
element of quality or dignity which is essential to make them the basis
for a plea of res judicata in subsequent controversies? One thing, at
least, is clear. Res judicata is a function of the judicial process. The
decision of a court may be given conclusive effect in the same court,12
10. Blair v. Linn, 274 Ill. App. 23 (1934) (one judge dissenting).
11. See Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal
Taxation (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1299-1300. In Comment (1933) 33 COL. L.
Ray. 1404, 1413, n. 51, it is stated that of eighty-five cases, mostly state decisions, in
which res judicata was raised, the contention was made on behalf of the government
in only eleven. The proportion in the federal tax cases here considered is higher, but
the taxpayer has fared distinctly better than the Treasury.
12. Donald v. White Lumber Co., 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Second
Nat. Bank v. United States, 66 Ct. CIs. 166 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 553 (1929) ;
International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cis. 132, 56 F. (2d)
708 (1932) ; Chicago Junction Rys. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cis. 824, 10 F. Supp. 156
(1935); Bowe-Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F. (2d) 394 (D. Minn. 1930). All
but the first of these cases and all of the cases cited in the next two footnotes involved
second suits with respect to taxes for the same year or on the same estate. The cases
in these three footnotes are, of course, in addition to those in the second paragraph of
note 33, infra, involving Board decisions which had been reviewed by the courts.
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in another court, 3 or by the Board of Tax Appeals; 4 and a decision
in a state court may be a bar to subsequent proceedings in a federal
court.'" But the determinations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
are not binding on him either with respect to the same year or subse-
quent tax years,' 6 and consequently are not res judicata.' T
Between these two points, however, the question is far from clear. Are
the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals res judicata, even though
this effect was not accorded to determinations of the Committee on
Appeals and Review which preceded it and performed similar func-
tions? Here a distinction must be made between the position of the
Board of Tax Appeals under the Revenue Act of 1924 and its position
under the Act of 1926. Doubtless it was in part because of the feeling
that the Board under the 1924 Act was in substance not very different
from the Committee preceding it, that it was concluded that the Board's
decisions were not res judicata in subsequent controversies.", Its deter-
minations were to a considerable extent administrative, in fact as well
as in form. Either party could start a suit in a district court within
a year after the Board's decision. While in this action the Board's
findings were "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,"1" the
trial in the district court was a trial de novo, and neither party was lim-
ited to the evidence or the grounds presented before the Board. The
decision of the Board became final if no new action was begun within
the year, but the parties would not ordinarily regard the Board pro-
ceeding as the ultimate occasion for the determination of tax liability.
As one court has said, "The hearing before the Board was at that time
little more than a preliminary skirmish, a run for luck." - Yet, although
13. Second Nat. Bank v. Woodworth, 66 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Bertel-
sen v. White, 58 F. (2d) 792 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 1st,
1933) ; Art Metal Const. Co. v. United States, 82 Ct. Cls. 666, 13 F. Supp. 756 (1936) ;
United States v. Utah Idaho Sugar Co., 15 A. F. T. R. 1037 (D. Utah 1934); Guettel
v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 725 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
14. Garcin v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1027 (1931), remanded on slipulation of
parties, 79 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (transferee case).
15. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 76 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
16. Burnet v. Porter, 283 U. S. 230 (1931) ; McIlheny v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d)
356 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Tonningsen v. Commissioner, 61 F. (2d) 199 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932); Omaha Baum Iron Store, Inc. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cls. 67, S F. Supp. 703
(1934), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 576 (1935); Art Metal Const. Co. v. United States, 17
F. Supp. 854 (Ct. Cls. 1937); West Huntsville Cotton Mills Co. v. Commissioner,
22 B. T. A. 1216 (1931); Ford & Co. v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. 156 (1933); Fisher
v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 1041 (1934).
17. It is usually said that the Commissioner is not bound by his orm decisions.
But sometimes the point is put in terms of res judicata. See Co-operative Pub. Co.
v. Commissioner, 5 B. T. A. 340, 343 (1926).
18. These cases are discussed at p. 1324, infra.
19. REVENuE Acr oF 1924 § 900 (g).
20. Blair v. Curran, 24 F. (2d) 390, 392 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
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both the Court of Claims 2' and the Board 2 have held that Board de-
cisions before the 1926 Act do not have conclusive effect,23 these Board
decisions are not wholly without vitality. A decision of the Board
under the 1924 Act establishes a prima facie case in a subsequent suit
even as to a different taxable year.24 And where the decision of the
Board, though in a case filed under the 1924 Act, had been based on a
stipulation filed by way of compromise, the decision is binding in sub-
sequent litigation; like a consent judgment, it is contractual in nature.25
The decisions of the present Board, as constituted under the Revenue
Act of 1926, have apparently passed the line separating the merely "ad-
ministrative," which are subject to reexamination, from the "judicial,"
21. Daily Pantagraph, Inc. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cis. 251, 37 F. (2d) 783 (1929);
Lattimore v. United States, 82 Ct. Cis. 97, 12 F. Supp. 895 (1935); Van Dorn Iron
Works Co. v. United States, 82 Ct. CIs. 684, 13 F. Supp. 758 (1936).
22. Appeal of Union Metal Mfg. Co., 4 B. T. A. 287 (1926); Monroe Stationery
Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 1227 (1929); Stegeman v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A.
949 (1932) (transferee case). In the Union M[etal case the Board expressly overruled
the decision in Appeal of Gilliam Mfg. Co., 2 B. T. A. 272 (1925). Though the incon-
clusive nature of the Board's determination under the early Act was a material factor
in the case, much of the Board's opinion is on grounds which would deny res judicata
in all tax cases. The Union Metal case was generally regarded as holding that res
judicata was not applicable in federal tax cases, until the contrary was established in
Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933). See, e.g., Goodell-Pratt Co. v.
Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1235 (1927) ; Monroe Stationery Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
23. The date of the hearing befbre the Board and of its decision were material in
determining the mode of review of Board decisions under the 1926 Act. If the hearing
had been held before the 1926 Act became law, the circuit court of appeals had no
jurisdiction of a petition for review. The only remedy was to pay the tax and sue
in a district court for a refund. Rxv.UE Act OF 1926 § 283 (j), Blair v. Curran, 24 F.
(2d) 390 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928). But if the petition was filed under the 1924 Act and the
hearing and decision came after the 1926 Act was enacted, the taxpayer had an option
to pay the tax and sue in the district court, or to seek review of the Board's decision
by a circuit court of appeals. Indeed, apparently he might do both. RavI.NuE ACT or
1926 § 283 (b); see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 727-28
(1929). Review by the district court would be de novo as before, while review by the
circuit court of appeals would be on the record made before the Board. In either event,
it would seem that the court decision should be the basis for res judicata. This was
expressly recognized in the Old Colony case, supra, at 728, and it was so held in Port-
age Silica Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 881 (1934) and Mills Automatic Mer-
chandising Corp. v. United States, Ct. CIs., May 3, 1937. Cf. Van Dorn Iron Works Co.
v. United States, 82 Ct. CIs. 684, 13 F. Supp. 758 (1936) (res judicata not applicable
to Board decision where taxpayer's petition for review in a circuit court of appeals was
dismissed for lack of prosecution). The contrary result was reached somewhat ques-
tionably in Patterson v. Anderson, S. D. N. Y., Oct. 5, 1936.
24. Commissioner v. American Seating Co., 50 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931);
Goodell-Pratt Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1235 (1927).
25. Backus v. United States, 75 Ct. Cis. 69, 59 F. (2d) 242 (1932), cert. denied,
288 U. S. 610 (1933).
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which are the basis of res judicata.2 The 1926 Act provided that the
Board is "continued as an independent agency in the Executive Branch
of the Government. ' 27 This terminology was expanded by the Supreme
Court in Old Colony Trust Company zo. Commissioncr,- where it was
said that the Board "is not a court. It is an executive or administrative
board, upon the decision of which the parties are given an opportunity
to base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative in-
quiry of the Board has been had and decided." All in all, a good deal
of ink has been spilled on the subject of the exact nature of the
Board.29 But there seems to be very little room to doubt that for
present purposes its decisions are essentially judicial. As one court has
put it:30
"The Board of Tax Appeals, while not a court, has by statute
been endowed with capacity to render decisions final and binding
on both Commissioner and taxpayer unless reversed on appeal. Its
decisions in matters over which it has jurisdiction are therefore
not open to collateral attack, and it cannot be doubted that in this
sense a decision of the Board is comparable to the judgment of a
court."3 1
Regardless of the exact form of words which we may be forced to
choose because of our notions of the effect of the constitutional grant
of judicial power and of the implications of the separation of powers,
the fact remains that the activity actually carried on by the Board is
judicial and solely judicial, in the sense that what the Board does is
the impartial determination of questions of fact and law, after full
hearing, with a minimum of judgments in the field of policy. Ve have,
if you like, the paradox that, of all the non-judicial tribunals in our
26. There is some authority that administrative decisions may be the basis of res
judicata when they are judicial in nature. See Abel, Administra pve Dcierminations and
Fill Faith and Credit (1937) 22 IowA L. Rm. 461, 515-25; Comment (1933) 46 HAnv.
L. REv. 692, 695, n. 21. But it seems fundamentally misleading to say that the activities
of the Board are in any true sense "administrative."
27. RE VxuE AcT OF 1926 § 1000, amending RBE:EuE Act OF 1924 § 900.
28. 279 U. S. 716, 725 (1929).
29. Cf., e.g., Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123, 131 (1935); Commissioner v.
Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Underwood v. Com-
missioner, 56 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) ; the opinion of Goodrich in Garden City
Feeder Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 1132, 1137 (1933), rev'd, 75 F. (2d) 804
(C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 469, 474 (1934) ;
see 5 PAUL AND MERTENs, FE.DmAL INcomE TAX-vrioN (1934) §§ 43.01-43.02, Comment
(1933) 46 HAv. L. Rsv. 692, 695.
30. American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 8 F. Supp. 562 (S. D. N. Y.
1934). Citations are omitted.
31. Id. at 566; see Backus v. United States, 75 Ct. CIs. 69, 103, 59 F. (2d) 242, 25S
(1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 610 (1933) ("The functions of the Board of Tax Appeals
are judicial.").
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government system, the one which is in form most intimately incorpor-
ated into the executive branch is carrying on a function as intrinsically
judicial as that exercised by any court. In any event, there is now sub-
stantial agreement that decisions of the Board are a basis of res judicata"2
whether they have been reviewed by a court or not.13
II. THE ISSUES
Ve may turn next to the nature or subject matter of the decisions
which may be res judicata in a subsequent tax litigation. It will be con-
32. The only dissent from this view seems to come from the Sixth Circuit. In
Nachod & U. S. Signal Co. v. Helvering, 74 F. (2d) 164, 166 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934), the
court expressly passed "the question whether the Board of Tax Appeals acts to
such extent judicially as to give its decisions the binding force required by the doc-
trine of res judicata;" and Judge Allen, in her dissenting opinion [id. at 169], said, "I
concur in the view that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to an order of the
Board of Tax Appeals," although it does not seem that the majority actually expressed
such a view. Cf. Leininger v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 791, 792 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
33. An unreviewed Board decision is conclusive in a later case involving a different
tax year. Greenbaum v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 83 (Ct. Cis. 1936); Missouri Pa-
cific R. R. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 267 (1931); Carney v. Commissioner, 22
B. T. A. 721 (1931) (transferee case) ; Hailer v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 395 (1932),
aff'd, 68 F. (2d) 780 (App. D. C. 1934); Sand Springs Ry. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A.
392 (1934); Wobber Bros. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 133 (1934); Parker v. Com-
missioner, 31 B. T. A. 644 (1934), appeal, dismissed, 75 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935) ; cf. Donald v. J. J. White Lpmber Co., 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
But cf. Nachod & U. S. Signal Co. v. Helvering, 74 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
An unreviewed Board decision is likewise conclusive in another proceeding with re-
spect to the same tax year. Continental Petroleum Co. v. United States, 87 F. (2d)
91 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; T. W. Warner Co. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 160 (Ct. Cis.
1936); Bindley v. Heiner, 38 F. (2d) 489 (W. D. Pa. 1930); cf. Western Wheeled
Scraper Co. v. United States, 72 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; Warren Mfg. Co.
v. Tait, 60 F. (2d) 982 (D. Md. 1932) ; Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. United States,
15 A. F. T. R. 1001 (N. D. IIl. 1934), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 73 F. (2d) 1019
(C. C. A. 7th, 1934). And see the second paragraph of note 40, infra. The same result
has been reached when the decision of the Board was based on a stipulation. Bankers
Reserve Life Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cis. 279, 44 F. (2d) 1000 (1930), cert. dcnied,
283 U. S. 836 (1931) ; Backus v. United States, 75 Ct. Cis. 69, 59 F. (2d) 242 (1932),
cert. denied, 288 U. S. 610 (1933); Castle v. United States, 17 F. Supp, 515 (Ct. Cis.
1937); American Woolen Co. v. United States, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv.
ff 9212 (Ct. Cis. 1937); cf. Pankratz Lumber Co. v. Poe, 16 A. F. T. R. 1103 (W. D.
Wash. 1935).
A prior court decision reviewing a Board proceeding for a previous taxable year is
conclusive when the same issue is presented again. Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289
U. S. 620 (1933); Leininger v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936);
Worm v. Harrison, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 9234 (N. D. Ill. 1937); Green
v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 719 (1932) (transferee case); Portage Silica Co. v. Com-
missioner, 29 B. T. A. 881 (1934) ; Marshall v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 1075 (1934),
appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, C. C. A. 6th, April 9, 1935; James v. Com-
missioner, 31 B. T. A. 712 (1934); Terre Haute Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A.
975 (1936); Pryor & Lockhart Development Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 687
(1936).
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venient to divide the inquiry by considering separately cases in which
the second controversy involves taxes for the same year or on the same
estate as the first,34 and cases in which the second controversy involves
a different tax year.
A. The Same Tax Year. Where the same issue is concerned in the
subsequent case, the problem presented is one of the ordinary applica-
tion of res judicata but this situation has arisen rarely. The principal
case in which an effort has been made to relitigate a point once de-
termined with respect to the same tax liability is Art Metal Construction
Company v. United States.35 The taxpayer first brought a suit to recover
a refund which the Commissioner had denied on the ground that an
amendment filed out of time was not sufficient to perfect a claim for
refund phrased in general terms. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the Commissioner and denied recovery." An application for certi-
orari was denied. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court," how-
ever, appeared to establish that this result was wrong, and the taxpayer
brought another suit in the Court of Claims to secure the same refund.
This was held to be barred by res judicata. If there is to be anything
of res judicata in tax- cases, it is hard to see how the decision could
have been otherwise despite the obvious hardship to the taxpayer.3
34. Because of the recurrent nature of the income tax, res judicata questions are
usually presented in income tax cases. The questions have been encountered, however,
in the following estate tax cases: Second Nat. Bank v. United States, C6 Ct. CIs. 165
(1928), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 553 (1929); Second Nat. Bank v. Woodworth, 65 F.
(2d) 170 .(C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Bindley v. Heiner, 38 F. (2d) 489 (NV. D. Pa. 1930);
Guettel v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 725 (NV. D. Mo. 1936); City Nat. Bank: v. Com-
missioner, 16 B. T. A. 719 (1929); Cararick v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 12 (1930);
cf. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 1st,
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 700 (1933).
35. 82 Ct. CIs. 666, 13 F. Supp. 756 (1936). In Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Commis-
sioner, 22 B. T. A. 267 (1931), the parent corporation had intervened in a subsidiary's
proceeding before the Board, and was held bound when the same question, affiliation,
was later presented in a case involving its own liability for the same year. Cf. Var-
ren Mfg. Co. v. Tait, 60 F. (2d) 982 (D. lMd. 1932); United States v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 76 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); United States v. Utah Idaho Sugar Co., 15
A. F. T. R. 1037 (D. Utah 1934).
36. Art Metal Const. Co. v. United States, 47 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
37. Art Metal Const. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 863 (1931).
38. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62 (1933); United States
v. Factors & Finance Co., 288 U. S. 89 (1933); Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. United States,
289 U. S. 28 (1933) ; George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373 (1933).
39. The prosecution of this claim was dogged throughout with misfortune. In April,
1936, Congress passed a special Act giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine
the taxpayer's case, "any finding, determination, judgment, rule of law, or statute to
the contrary notwithstanding." 80 ConG. Rnc. 5916, 5972 (1936). But, on May 5,
1936, the President vetoed the bill [SEN. Doc. No. 205, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935);
80 CoNG. REC. 6768 (1936)], treating it in his veto message as an ordinary instance
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More frequently there has been an effort to present in the second suit
a point not raised or passed upon in the first decision. Attempts of this
sort have been almost uniformly unsuccessful. Whether the second suit
involves an income tax on the same year's income,40 or an estate tax on
the same estate,4 ' the courts quite consistently hold that a cause of action
of the waiving of the Statute of Limitations, without disclosing any awareness of the
intervening Supreme Court decisions or of their bearing on the merits of the tax-
payer's claim.
40. American Woolen Co. v. United States, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 9212
(Ct. CIs. 1937); Chicago Junction Rys. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cis. 824, 10 F. Supp.
156 (1935) ; International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. CIs. 132,
56 F. (2d) 708 (1932) ; Backus v. United States, 75 Ct. Cis. 69, 59 F. (2d) 242 (1932),
cert. dcnied, 288 U. S. 610 (1933) ; Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. United States, 71 Ct.
CIs. 279, 44 F. (2d) 1000 (1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 836 (1931) ; Continental Pe-
troleum Co. v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Bertelsen v. White,
58 F. (2d) 792 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); Bowe-
Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F. (2d) 394 (D. Minn. 1930) ; cf. Greylock Mills v.
White, 55 F. (2d) 704 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd. 63 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933),
cert. denied. 289 U. S. 760 (1933). Where the first decision is one by or through the
Board, the resultant finality is in part due to the provisions of the REVEN;UE AC1
OF 1926 § 284 (d), and the REvEN UE ACTS or 1928, 1932, 1934 and 1936 §322 (d).
Under these sections, if the taxpayer files an appeal with the Board, no refund shall
be made "and no suit by the taxpayer for the recovery of any part of such tax shall be
instituted in any court" except in accordance with a decision of the Board which has
become final. Cf. Continental Petroleum Co. v. United States, supra, at 94; Bankers
Reserve Life Co. v. United States. supra; Bindley v. Heiner, 38 F. (2d) 489 (W. D.
Pa. 1930) ; see Kelly v. United States; 57 Sup. Ct. 335 (1937). Section 179 of the Judicial
Code has much the same effect on judgments of the Court of Claims. Bertelsen v. White,
supra.
Once a petition is filed with the Board. a court has no jurisdiction of a subsequent
suit against either the United States or a collector. Brampton Woolen Co. v. Field,
56 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932); James v. United States, 69 Ct. Cls. 215, 38 F.
(2d) 140 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 856 (1930). But if a suit for a refund has
been started before the taxpayer's petition to the Board, the jurisdiction of the court
is not defeated. Both cases may proceed; the one first terminated apparently will be con-
trolling. Ohio Steel Foundry Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cis. 158, 38 F. (2d) 144 (1930).
41. Second Nat. Bank v. Woodworth, 66 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) ; Second
Nat. Bank v. United States, 66 Ct. Cis. 166 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 553 (1929) ;
Bindley v. Heiner, 38 F. (2d) 489 (W. D. Pa. 1930); Guettel v. United States, 17 F.
Supp. 725 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
This rule has not been invoked in the long drawn out litigation over the tax on the
estate of William Waldorf Astor. In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d)
14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), the tax paid on a trust created in 1916 was recovered-a
result that seems erroneous in the light of later Supreme Court decisions, especially
Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (1933). Different suits were then brought to recover
the tax paid on two other trusts. Judgments against the Government for about
$10,000,000, with nearly as much more in interest, were reversed on appeal; the cases
are now awaiting retrial. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 68 F. (2d) 916
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 565 (1934), 296 U.S. 649 (1935), 299
U.S. 582 (1936). The rule against splitting a cause of action apparently has not been
raised in the later actions, apparently because the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company
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cannot be split up and litigated in separate parts. This, of course, is
not a result peculiar to tax cases. In Stark z,. Starr,- the Supreme Court
said that a litigant
"is not at liberty to split up his demand and prosecute it by piece-
meal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon which special
relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit,
if the first fail. There would be no end to litigation if such a prac-
tice were permissible."
This principle is a sort of corollary of the rule, illustrated in Le-wis v.
Reynolds," that a suit for the recovery of a tax throws open all questions
relating to the same tax year. The principle is rather absolute in its
character. The second suit is barred though the facts upon which it rests
occurred after the first case was decided,44 or though its basis is a Supreme
Court decision announced after the close of the first litigation. 4' Nor is
the application of the rule dependent upon what was actually open to
litigation in the first case. Thus, a taxpayer may not sue in court except
upon a ground which he has specified in a claim for refund." But if he
sues on a claim for a particular year and the case goes to judgment, he
may not thereafter bring a suit on another claim for the same year, even
though the ground of the second suit was not available in the first for
want of an adequate refund claim at that time.T
There are a few cases that do not fit very well into this rather ironclad
rule. In Cambridge Loan & Building Company v. United States," it
appeared that the Commissioner had allowed a claim for refund in part
and denied it in part. The taxpayer sued and recovered as to the disal-
lowed part. In the meantime the allowed portion had not been paid,
due, apparently, to mechanical misunderstandings in the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue. The taxpayer eventually was forced to sue for the
allowed portion of its claim. This was, in fact, a second suit for the
recovery of tax for the same taxable year, but recovery was allowed
paid the tax as trustee of the respective trusts, and under the New York practice a
trustee of several trusts is considered legally as a different person in the case of
each trust.
42. 94 U. S. 477, 485 (1876).
43. 284 U. S. 281 (1932).
44. Bindley v. Heiner, 33 F. (2d) 489 (W. D. Pa. 1930).
45. Guettel v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 725 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
46. United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 23 U. S. 269 (1931).
47. Chicago Junction Rys. v. United States, 80 Ct. CIs. 824, 10 F. Supp. 156 (1935);
cf. Bowe-Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F. (2d) 394 (D. Minn. 1930) ; International
Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. CIs. 132, 56 F. (2d) 703 (1932).
Another situation in which a judgment concerning one year's taxes may be conclusive
in a subsequent suit over the same taxes, is that involving the liability of a transferee.
These cases are discussed at pp. 1347-51, infra.
48. 74 Ct. CIs. 500, 57 F. (2d) 936 (1932).
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by the Court on the then current account-stated theory, 49 on the ground
that the allowance of the claim for refund gave rise to a new cause of
action independent of that for the recovery of the tax.
More difficult to justify is the recent decision in Ventura Consolidated
Oil Fields v. Rogan.5" The Commissioner made an improper assess-
ment without sending the taxpayer a prior deficiency notice complying
with the Statute. Thereafter the Commissioner determined an addi-
tional deficiency, of which the taxpayer was duly notified. The notice dis-
closed the prior assessment and took it into account in fixing the amount
of the deficiency. The taxpayer then filed a petition with the Board which
did not question the prior assessment. Pursuant to a stipulation, the
Board determined deficiencies, and they were paid. When the collector
later undertook to collect the amount of the prior assessment, the tax-
payer sought an injunction on the ground that the assessment was
invalid. In granting the injunction the appellate court held that the
decision of the Board did not establish the validity of the prior assess-
ment, even though the question was open before the Board and the validity
of the assessment was assumed by it in determining the deficiencies. In
effect, a second suit with respect to the same tax year was allowed, and
the taxpayer was permitted to litigate a point which had been open for
determination in the prior proceeding. This result seems to be in con-
flict with the view adopted in another recent case where the Court of
Claims said :r
"Under the statute and the ruling which we have made in several
decisions the order of the Board became res judicata not only as to
such matters as were submitted to the Board, but as to all other
matters with reference to the taxes for these two years which might
have been presented."
A distinguishable situation involving a second suit with regard to
the same year, is presented with respect to overpayments determined by
the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board's jurisdiction was originally
limited to reviewing the correctness of a deficiency asserted by the Com-
missioner, but in 1926, this was extended to permit determination of
the amount of any overpayment.52 However, the Board regarded its
authority as limited to the determination of the fact and the amount of
the overpayment. Whether that overpayment was refundable or not
might depend upon questions that related to the claims for refund
49. Cf. Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 258 (1932), qualified in
Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54 (1934).
50. 86 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 610 (1937).
51. American Woolen Co. v. United States, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv.
9212 (Ct. Cls. 1937).
52. RmNuE Acr OF 1926 §§284 (e), 319 (c).
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and the Statute of Limitations. s If the Board found an overpay-
ment, the Commissioner had to decide whether it was refundable, and
the taxpayer aggrieved by his adverse decision had no recourse except
through a suit in court. The statutory limitations of the Board's author-
ity are reflected in the results reached in the application of res judicata.
Where a suit is brought in a court to recover an overpayment determined
by the Board of Tax Appeals which the Commissioner has refused to
refund, the cases are in accord that the decision of the Board is res
judicata as to the fact of overpayment." If the court finds that refund
of the overpayment is barred for failure to file a proper claim or peti-
tion in time, the taxpayer is not entitled to judgment though the Board's
decision establishes the overpayment." In 1934, however, the Board
was given authority to determine whether the tax was paid within a
period so as to make it refundable.50 The Board's decision on this point
should, of course, be res judicataY5
There is another group of cases in which a determination by the Board
for a particular tax year does not bar a subsequent suit. If, in connec-
tion with a claim for abatement, the taxpayer furnished a bond to insure
the payment of the tax which might eventually be determined to be due,
53. Appeal of Dickerman & Englis, Inc., 5 B. T. A. 633 (1926); Gould-Mersereau
Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1316, 1323 (1931).
54. Warner Co. Y. United States, 15 F. Supp. 160 (Ct. Cis. 1936); National Fire
Ins. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. CIs. 663, 52 F. (2d) 1011 (1931); Western Wheeled
Scraper Co. v. United States, 72 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; Pankratz Lumber Co.
v. Poe, 16 A. F. T. R. 1103 (AV. D. Wash. 1935) ; cf. United States v. Elgin Nat. Watch
Co., 66 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. United
States, 15 A. F. T. R. 1001 (N. D. Ill. 1934), appeal disnissed on stipidation, 73 F.
(2d) 1019 (C. C.A. 7th, 1934); Goodenough v. United States, Ct. Cis., May 3, 1937.
55. National Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cis. 663, 52 F. (2d) 1011 (1931).
56. REvE UE Act oF 1934 § 322 (d). The same section is in the 1936 Act. In the
R.vExNE Acr OF 1934 § 504, a corresponding amendment was made to the Ra%,E:.un Acrs
OF 1928 and 1932 § 322 (d), and to the RmETNUE ACT OF 1926 §284 (e).
57. The Board still has no power to order a refund. Jones v. Commissioner, 34
B. T. A. 280 (1936). The committee reports on the 1934 Act [H. IL R ,. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 35; SEIx. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 44] affirmed
the intention of Congress to enable the Board "to terminate the litigation in one pro-
ceeding;" but it is clear that the statute is not yet broad enough to reach that result.
An interesting question may be raised as to the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of
appeals to review a decision of the Board determining an overpayment. If the court
affirms the Board's determination of an overpayment, may the Commissioner still refuse
to pay on the ground that a proper claim was not filed? If he may, there would seem
to be reason to doubt that the appeal is within the judicial power. Cf. Gordon V. United
States, 2 Wall. 561 (U. S. 1865); United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477, 420 (185).
Yet it is quite clear that on review of the Board's decision the court could not deter-
mine the refundability of the overpayment, since that question was not before the Board,
and there would ordinarily be no basis in the record for a decision on that point. Per-
haps the decision on overpayment might be regarded as the equh-alent of a declaratory
judgment on that subject alone.
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the Government may recover on this bond although the Board of Tax
Appeals has determined that because of the Statute of Limitations there
is no tax deficiency.5" The issue before the Board is not the same as
that before the court in the suit on the bond, because there may be
liability on the bond although the liability for the tax has expired."9 A
decision that the tax is barred by limitations therefore is not a decision
on a point relevant in the suit on the bond. "The effective scope of the
decision rendered is no broader than the issue, opinion, and findings."" 0
And this was held to be true even though the statute provided that the
decision of the Board that the tax was barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions should "be considered as its decision that there is no deficiency
with respect to such tax."'" A literal construction of the statute, the
court held, would not be consonant with the legislative intent.
An interesting variation of this point appeared in Hilton Lumber Co.
v. Grissom," where a bond was executed to cover a tax liability. The
taxes were paid after the statutory period had expired, and a consent
judgment was entered dismissing a suit on the bond and cancelling it.
The taxpayer then brought an action to recover the tax payment, alleg-
ing that it was made after the limitation period had expired. This suit
was held to be barred by the judgment entered in the suit brought on
the bond. Although there is an element of res judicata here, the decision
is primarily an application of the rule that, after a tax bond has been
satisfied by payment, the money may not be recovered because it was
collected as a tax after the statutory time for such a collection had
expired.6 3
58. Gulf States Steel Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 32 (1932); United States v.
Martin Hotel Co., 59 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 651
(1932) (deposit in escrow); United States v. Wyoming Central Ass'n, 70 F. (2d) 869
(C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
59. United States v. John Barth Co., 279 U. S. 370 (1929).
60. Gulf States Stel Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 32, 44 (1932).
61. REVENUE AcT or 1924 § 906 (e), as amended. The bond in suit in the Gulf
States Steel case was given after the period for the collection of taxes had expired,
but it was the successor of two earlier bonds, the first made just before the expiration of
the statutory period. In United States v. Wyoming Central Ass'n, 70 F. (2d) 869
(C. C. A. 10th, 1934), the bond was executed after the limitations period had expired.
The effect given to the bond was thus similar to that given to a waiver executed after
the expiration of the statutory period. Cf. Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U. S. 485
(1934). There is a curious consequence here-giving a waiver or a bond after the
statutory period has expired will bind the taxpayer, while an actual payment of the
tax out of time may ordinarily be recovered.
62. 70 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 613 (1934).
63. Roberts Sash & Door Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cls. 363, 38 F. (2d) 716
(1930), aff'd per curiamn, 282 U. S. 812 (1930) ; Bryant-Link Co. v. Hopkins, 47 F. (2d)
1068 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) ; United States v. Root, 62 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933),
cert. denied, 289 U. S. 733(1933); Simmons Mfg. Co. v. Routzahn, 62 F. (2d) 947
(C. C. A. 6th, 1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 751 (1933).
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B. Different Tax Years. In the previous paragraphs, the discussion
has been limited to cases in which the second suit involved liability for
taxes in the same tax year or on the same estate as the first. Much
more difficult is the question whether a decision for one tax year is
conclusive in a subsequent litigation involving a different year, and the
cases, in result at least, are enshrouded in confusion. There is agree-
ment that res judicata in this situation is limited to the precise question
which was decided in the former case; but there is little harmony in
determining what types of questions fit this test. Questions of law and
of fact are infinite in variety, and there is an imperceptible gradation
from the few situations in which it is clear that precisely the same
issue is involved in two litigations for different years, to the multitude
of cases in which it is equally clear that the questions involved are dif-
ferent. Between the two extremes is a wide area of doubt. And there
are further difficulties. Even if we grant that res judicata applies to
questions of law and to questions of fact, does it apply to the law portion
of mixed questions of law and fact? All cases involve both law and
facts, although the one or the other may not be in dispute in a particular
controversy. How far, then, does res judicata apply to the law when
the facts in the second case, though different, are found not to be differ-
ent in legal effect? And when we talk about a question of fact being
res judicata, does that apply to the evidentiary facts only or to the
ultimate facts, though there may be an attempt to offer different evi-
dentiary facts in the two cases?"
The tax decisions give no satisfactory answers to questions of this
sort. It may be useful, however, to attempt to list the cases along the
scale which extends from the "same issue" at one end to "different
issue" at the other. We may take up first the cases in which res judicata
was held applicable. This result has been reached where the second case
involved the same ultimate fact as that decided in the first: the value
of minerals or timber on March 1, 1913,1 and the amount of earnings
of a corporation since March 1, 1913, available for dividends on January
1, 1918.'6 Of course, there is a certain amount of law in determinations
64. Another question may be raised as to the influence of variations in the burden
of proof in the two cases. Peck v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 402 (1936); ef. Pan-
kratz Lumber Co. v. Poe, 16 A. F. T. R. 1103 (NV. D. Wash. 1935); Thomas Cusak Co.
v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1105 (1929). The question as to penalties [see p. 1354,
infra] is quite similar.
65. Portage Silica Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 881 (1934); Donald v. J. J.
White Lumber Co., 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); cf. American Chemical Paint
Co. v. McCaughan, E. D. Pa., April 21, 1937 (value of a patent).
66. James v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 712 (1934). In Commissioner v. American
Seating Co., 50 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) a determination of invested capital
for one year was relied on for the following year. The previous findings vere held
to make a prima facie case. It should be noted that the first decision of the Board was
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such as these. The same result has been reached in cases apparently in-
volving more law and less fact, with the ultimate fact issue identical
in the two cases -whether certain transactions constituted a gift of
stock from a husband to a wife,67 whether bonds were issued for con-
sideration,6" and whether contracts had value on March 1, 1913." In
other cases, res judicata has been held applicable where the question
was more nearly one of law with the ultimate facts in the two cases
identical, or at least similar in the geometric sense: the deductibility of
amortized discount on a predecessor's bonds ;70 the deductibility of de-
preciation by a lessor and the lessor's liability for tax on the taxes paid
for it by the lessee;71 the construction and legal effect of a will;72 and
the deductibility of payments made on certain notes where the previous
case had allowed the deduction of payments made on other notes exe-
cuted under similar circumstances. 3 Finally, and more doubtfully, the
rule of res judicata has been applied to determinations of a partnership
relationship between the taxpayer and others,74 and of the taxability of
a business trust as an "association." 75 In these cases the question does
involve a large element of law; but the facts in succeeding years are
necessarily different, and the ultimate legal consequence is very much a
function not only of the prior decision on the law, but also of the pos-
sibly dissimilar facts.
We may turn next to cases in which the rule of res judicata was held
not applicable although the questions in the two cases were at least
under the 1924 Act [see pp. 1323-24, supra] ; and the second case was decided before the
Western Maryland case established the role of res judicata in tax cases.
67. Marshall v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 1075 (1934), appeal dismissed for want
of prosecution, C. C. A. 6th, April 9, 1935. But the previous decision was held not
res judicata as to subsequent, though similar, transactions.
68. Sand Springs Ry. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 392 (1934).
69. Worm v. Harrison, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. 9234 (N. D. Il1. 1937);
Wobber Bros. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 133 (1934).
70. Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933). Res judicata was not
relied upon by the taxpayer in Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552 (1932),
involving the treatment of premium on bonds issued before 1913.
71. Terre Haute Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 975 (1936).
72. Haller v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 395 (1932), aff'd, 68 F. (2d) 780 (App.
D. C. 1934. But cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937), discussed at pp.
1344-45, infra, where there was an intervening state court decision.
73. Greenbaum v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 83 (Ct. Cls. 1936).
74. Leininger v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); Parker v.
Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 644 (1934), appeal dimnissed, 75 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935).
75. Pryor & Lockhart Development Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 687 (1936).
But cf. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 1070 (1935), aff'd, 80 F. (2d)
865 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 659 (1936); Uniform Printing & Sup-
ply Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 1073 (1936), rev'd, 88 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937).
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closely related. Some of these cases seem quite indistinguishable from
those just mentioned. A decision that income from a contract with a
water district was exempt has been held not res judicata in a case arising
under a subsequent but substantially identical contract."0 In another case,
a decision on the legal effect of certain margin transactions was held
not res judicata as to similar transactions in subsequent years, for,
"although the law may be the same, the facts, though similar, are dif-
ferent and, being different, they were not passed upon in that case."' T
In other cases it is more clear that the real question at issue relates to
the effect of facts which change from year to year. This has been recog-
nized in denying res judicata in cases involving the question whether a
corporation was "formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing
the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders,""t whether a cor-
poration was "doing business,"7 whether the taxpayer was a "business
league,"" 0  whether a corporation's activities were "charitable,"'" and
whether a group of corporations was affiliated in the respective taxable
years.82 Similarly, where the statutory provision involved in the two
cases is not the same, res judicata is not applicable. 3
76. Strickland v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 804 (1935). The decision in Volunteer
State Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 491, 495 (1937), is very similar.
77. Snyder v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 5, 6 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934), off'd, 295 U. S.
134 (1935). The res judicata point was not raised in the Supreme Court.
78. United Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 83 (1935), remrandcd pur-
suant to stipulation, C. C. A. 2d, Aug. 31, 1936; Almours Securities, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 35 B. T. A. 61 (1936). In the former case the Board said: "The application
of § 220 in any particular taxable year is wholly dependent upon whether the facts and
circumstances pertaining to that year bring the taxpayer within the scope of that sec-
tion-that is, was the corporation availed of for the prohibited purpose during the tax-
able year in question, irrespective of a finding by the Board and the courts that it was
so availed of in a prior taxable year." 33 B. T. A. 83, 8743 (1935). In the Alhours
Securities case, where the prior decision was based on a stipulation, res judicata was
also held inapplicable to the issue raised by the word "formed" in the statute.
79. International Salt Co. v. Phillips, 3 F. (2d) 678 (M. D. Pa. 1925), rez/d on
other grounds, 9 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925), which was re-'d, 274 U. S. 718 (1927).
80. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 1073 (1936),
re-/d, 88 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
81. Peck v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 402 (1936).
82. See Appeal of Canyon Lumber Co., 4 B. T. A. 940 (1926); cf. D. J. & T. Sulli-
van, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 1258 (1929), appeal dismissed, 43 F. (2d) 1073
(C. C. A. 9th, 1931). But see B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 23
(D. Mass. 1937), where the court said that if the prior decision "vas not technically
res adjudicata, the decision of the Board is at least prima facie evidence of the propriety
of consolidation." Where the two cases involve the same year, as where the parent
had intervened in a subsidiary's case, and later the same question arose as to the par-
ent's taxes, there is, of course, a basis for res judicata. Missouri Pacific R. R. v.
Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 267 (1931).
83. See Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 1070 (1935), aff'd, 80 F.
(2d) 865 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 659 (1936); Gus Sun Booking
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Perhaps the most important case in which res judicata has been re-
jected is Tait v. Commissioner,"4 where it was held that a prior decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals allowing depreciation at the rate of fifteen
per cent on certain machinery did not preclude a determination for a
subsequent year that an allowance of eight and one-half per cent was
proper. Though the court's opinion is very brief and gives no real
consideration to the problem, the result reached seems a desirable one.
There should be no vested right (or disability) in a matter involving
as much of a continuing judgment as a depreciation rate."'
Comparatively little difficulty is presented by a final group of cases
in which res judicata was urged, but was held inapplicable because the
issue previously decided was plainly quite different from that raised in
the later case. A decision that corporations were affiliated does not es-
tablish that one may deduct another's net loss;"" a decision against the
deductibility of depreciation does not prevent the deduction of obso-
lescence;" a decision that particular transactions were gifts from a
husband to his wife is not conclusive as to other transactions occurring
at different times ;ss and an acquittal for filing false amended returns
does not bar penalties for filing false original returns.8 9 Even though
the second suit is between different parties from those in the first, the
resulting inconclusiveness of the prior judgment has sometimes been
put on the ground that the questions in the two cases were different.90
Exchange Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B." T. A. 1197 (1928). But cf. the penalty cases, pp.
1351-55, in!ra, and Comment (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1404, 1405.
84. 78 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935). In Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. United
States, 15 A. F. T. R. 1001 (N. D. Ill. 1934), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 73 F.
(2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), the depreciation involved in the two cases was for the
sarde years, not different years; res judicata was applied.
85. See also Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 308, 311-12 (1932),
where the Court found it did not have to pass upon the contention that a prior decision
involving a depletion allowance was res judicata in a later case.
86. J. M. Smucker Co. v. Keystone Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 286 (W. D. Pa. 1935),
aff'd sub nora. Franklin v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936).
87. Terre Haute Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 975 (1936).
88. Marshall v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 1075 (1934), appeal dismissed for want
of prosecution, C. C. A. 6th, April 9, 1935.
89. Hanby v. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) ; ef. Scharton v.
Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 459 (1935), dismissed uithout written opinion, C. C. A. 1st,
April 29, 1936 (a judgment dismissing an indictment under the statute of limitations
does not bar the assertion of fraud penalties).
90. In American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 8 F. Supp. 562 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934), it was held that a decision in a transferor's case that certain waivers were
invalid was not a bar to a decision in the transferee's case that the transferee was es-
topped to assert that invalidity. Cf. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
66 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 700 (1933), where a deci-
sion of the Board evaluating charitable remainders for estate tax purposes was held not
to foreclose the question, arising in a subsequent income tax case, whether the income
was "permanently set aside" for charitable purposes.
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Before leaving this aspect of the general problem, reference should
be made to one case which may easily be misconstrued. In Western
Wheeled Scraper Company v. United States,"' the plaintiff, suing to
recover 1919 taxes, relied on a decision in a previous case involving
1920 taxes where it had been determined, on stipulation, that the tax-
payer had overstated its closing inventory for 1919. The holding of the
Court of Claims appears to have been that mere proof of this fact was
not sufficient to establish that the taxpayer had overpaid its taxes for
1919. Although this was enough to dispose of the case, the Court
based its result, in part, on the ground that the Board of Tax Appeals,
under the statute creating it, is limited in its authority to years for which
deficiencies have been determined, and "shall have no jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the tax for any other taxable year has been
overpaid or underpaid." 2 For this reason, said the court,O3 "the appli-
cation of the rule of res adjudicata as herein claimed" is expressly
excluded. Perhaps the saving words are "as herein claimed." Certainly,
the statute could not be fairly construed as making the rule of res
judicata generally inapplicable to decisions of the Boa'd of Tax Appeals
so far as different years are concerned. The argurment would be just
as applicable to a decision of a court on review oi a Board decision;
yet the decision given conclusive effect in Tait v. W~estern Maryland
Railway94 was made in a case which had come through the Board of
Tax Appeals.95 That the Board does not have jurisdiction over con-
troversies other than those properly brought before it does not dis-
tinguish it from other tribunals; no court has jurisdiction to render a
judgment which cannot be based on the pleadings before it. Yet it
cannot be successfully contended that the decision of a court is not res
judicata in another case because the court did not have jurisdiction of
the second controversy when it decided the first. Res judicata does not
depend on principles of jurisdiction, but on principles of peace.
C. Other Questions. The way in which the issues were decided may
become material in the application of res judicata. Must an adjudication
have been on the merits, or will a case be the basis of res judicata al-
though it was decided on stipulation, dismissed on the petitioner's mo-
tion, or allowed to go by default? There is considerable confusion on
91. 82 Ct. Cs. 646, 13 F. Supp. 762 (1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct 32 (1936). But
see Chicago Cemetery Ass'n v. United States, N. D. Ill., April 23, 1937.
92. R~vEl ox Acr OF 1928 § 272 (g), continued without change in the R=vmUE Acrs
oF 1932, 1934, and 1936.
93. 82 Ct. Cls. 646, 652, 13 F. Supp. 762, 764 (1936).
94. 289 U. S. 620 (1933).
95. This and other similar cases in which Board decisions have been held res
judicata as to subsequent years were distinguished by the government on the ground
that the precise point was not raised. See Brief in Opposition, pp. 7-8, Western Wheeled
Scraper Co. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, 1936, No. 237.
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these questions. When both actions relate to the same year's taxes, it
seems clear that the first case is binding in the second although the
first decision was based on stipulation rather than adjudication." There
is here the sanction of contract or compromise as well as that of res
judicata. The same result has also been reached where the prior pro-
ceeding was dismissed on the taxpayer's own motion"7 or went by
default." The Board has, however, refused to follow this rule in trans-
feree proceedings when the decision against the transferor was based
upon a stipulation;" in a few cases refusal to give the effect of res
judicata to a case based upon a stipulation has been extended to cases
against the same taxpayer for a subsequent year.100 When the issue is
the liability of the same taxpayer for a subsequent year, there is little
reason to quarrel with the result if it is kept within proper bounds.
Where the entire controversy is disposed of by the Board on stipula-
tion and without any consideration, there has been no adjudication. But
where a stipulation of facts is filed which the Board considers in render-
ing an actual decision, there is an adjudication which, tinder proper cir-
cumstances, should be res judicata in a subsequent case as to questions
96. In the following cases the decision based on stipulation was by the Board:
Continental Petroleum Co. v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936);
American Woolen Co. v. United States, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. 119212 (Ct.
Cis. 1937) ; Castle v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 515 (Ct. Cis. 1937) ; Backus v. United
States, 75 Ct. Cis. 69, 59 F. (2d) 242 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 610 (1933) ; Na-
tional Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cis. 663, 52 F. (2d) 1011 (1931) ; Bankers
Reserve Life Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cis. 279, 44 F. (2d) 1000 (1930), cert.
denied, 283 U. S. 836 (1931).
In the following cases the prior proceeding was before the Court of Claims: Second
Nat. Bank v. United States, 66 Ct. Cis. 166 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 553 (1929) ;
Second Nat. Bank v. Woodworth, 66 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Bertelsen v.
White, 58 F. (2d) 792 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933);
United States v. Utah Idaho Sugar Co., 15 A. F. T. R. 1037 (D. Utah 1934).
97. Warren Mfg. Co. v. Tait, 60 F. (2d) 982 (D. Md. 1932).
98. Garcin v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1027 (1931), remanded on stipulation of
parties, 79 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (transferee case).
99. See p. 1349, infra.
100. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 491 (1937). In
Appeal of Union Metal Mfg. Co., 4 B. T. A. 287 (1926), deciding generally against
the application of res judicata to tax cases, the Board said: "We should be even
more hesitant about applying it to facts thus stipulated for argument's sake." Id. at 290.
In Almours Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 61 (1936), the opinion relied
almost entirely on the transferee decisions; the result reached seems to have been right,
since the question involved was one as to which an adjudication as to one year should
not be res judicata as to another year in any event. See note 78, supra. Cf. International
Salt Co. v. Phillips, 3 F. (2d) 678 (M. D. Pa. 1925), re/d on other grounds, 9 F. (2d)
389 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925), which was rez'd, 274 U. S. 718 (1927) ; Bone v. United States,
46 F. (2d) 1010 (M. D. Ga. 1931).
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both of law and fact.1°' On at least one occasion the Board has so
held.1
0 2
Very little attention has been paid to the question whether a prior
judgment claimed to be conclusive must be pleaded, offered in evidence,
or whether it may be the subject of judicial notice. One court has
determined that it will take judicial notice of its own records for the
purpose of res judicata,10 3 and the Board has taken judicial notice of
a prior decision "under the circumstances."' 1 4 The Supreme Court has
recently passed over the question of the exact form and time in which
res judicata must be presented. 05
The seeming absolutism of the rule of res judicata encounters some
obstacles when there are two previous judgments, each inconsistent with
the other. This situation was presented in Dozald ',. J. J. White Lumber
Company.' The Government obtained a decision before the Board
as to the value of certain timber on March 1, 1913. A suit was then
brought against the collector with respect to a subsequent year, and a
value favorable to the taxpayer was fixed by the court.0 7 Finally, a
third action was brought for a still later year. In this last suit both
parties relied on the principle of res judicata. The court held that
"where there are two conflicting judgments, the last in point of time
is the one which controls."' 08 Where a Board decision for a subsequent
101. See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 660-65.
102. James v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 712 (1934). The decision given conclusive
effect in Tait v. Western 36d. Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933), was founded upon a stipula-
tion of facts.
103. Bowe-Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F. (2d) 394 (D. Minn. 1930).
104. Woodley Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 253 (1929). Judicial
notice will not be taken of a prior proceeding involving a different tax.payer. 1gleheart
v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). But see Drake v. Commissioner,
30 B. T. A. 475 (1934), where the two proceedings were considered and decided at the
same time. During the period when res judicata was thought to be inapplicable to tax
cases, there were decisions that findings in a prior proceeding would make a prima facfe
case, but that they must be introduced in evidence. Goodell-Pratt Co. v. Commissioner,
6 B. T. A. 1235 (1927) ; Wholesale Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 550 (1929) ;
cf. Reserve Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 951 (1929); Thomas Cusal:
Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 1105 (1929).
105. Blair v. Commissioner, 57 Sup. Ct. 330, 331-32 (1937); cf. Southern Pacific
R. R. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1 (1897) ; United States v. Bliss, 172 U.S. 321 (1899).
106. 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
107. The prior Board decision was not relied on by the Government, in line with its
then contention and the Board's decisions that res judicata was not applicable to tax
cases.
108. 68 F. (2d) 441, 442 (C. C. A. 5th. 1934). See the closely analogous result in
Blair v. Commissioner, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937) ; cf. Continental Oil Co. v. United States,
14 F. Supp. 533 (Ct. Cis. 1936). The issue is more fully developed in the petition for
certiorari and the brief in opposition, Continental Oil Co. v. United States, U. S. Sup.
Ct., October Term, 1936, No. 839.
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year became final pending a court review of a decision involving the
same issue for a prior year, res judicata was, with doubtful propriety,
held inapplicable.'0 9 In another case, a circuit court of appeals regarded
itself bound by a state court decision, although an appeal was pending
in the state courts." 0
III. PARTIES
Another question arising in the application of the principle of res
judicata relates to the parties in the respective cases. There is no diffi-
culty when the parties are the same in both cases. But to what extent
may the parties be different in form or substance without affecting the
conclusive effect of the prior judgment?
It is quite clear that the requirement as to parties is met if the
party in the second suit is in "privity" with the party in the first."'
Whether there is such privity becomes material in many federal tax cases
because tax controversies may involve any one of three parties on the
Government's side - the United States, the Commissioner, or a collector.
If the problem could be approached afresh, it should be fairly clear that
for the purposes of res judicata these parties are all in privity. The
Government is the real party in interest in all tax controversies, and the
fact that for reasons of history some officer or former officer of the
Government is made the nominal party, should not obscure the. sub-
stance of the situation." 2
Since there are three possible classes of parties on the Government
side, there are six combinations in which an adjudication involving one
may be raised as res judicata in a subsequent suit against another. All
of these combinations have been presented in actual cases. The principle
of res judicata is applied where the Commissioner was a party to the
first action and the second is against the United States 113 or against the
109. Nachod & U. S. Signal Co. v. Helvering, 74 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
110. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 76 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; cf.
Commissioner v. American Seating Co., 50 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). Of course,
an interlocutory order is not res judicata at a later stage of the same case. Holmes v.
Donald, 84 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
111. 1 FREEMA', JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 407-43.
112. Of course, if no one representing the Government was a party to the first action,
the decision is not binding on the Government. Bowers v. American Surety Co., 30 F.
(2d) 244 (C. C.A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 865 (1929). Cf. pp. 1343-45, infra.
113. Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933) ; Western Wheeled Scraper
Co. v. United States, 72 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Continental Petroleum Co.
v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Art Metal Const. Co. v. United
States, 82 Ct. Cls. 666, 13 F. Supp. 756 (1936); T. W. Warner Co. v. United States,
15 F. Supp. 160 (Ct. Cls. 1936); Greenbaum v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 83 (Ct. Cls.
1936) ; American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 8 F. Supp. 562 (S. D. N. Y.
1934); Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. United States, 15 A. F. T. R. 1001 (N. D.
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collector.' 14 The same result has been reached where the United States
was the party to the first action and the subsequent suit is against the
collector":5 or against the Commissioner."" A judgment involving the
United States in one court is, of course, effective as res judicata in a
subsequent suit against the United States in another court.Llr
In the other two possible situations, the collector was nominally the
party on the Government side in the first litigation. Here, to date, the
cases reach the other result: The prior judgment in the suit against the
collector is not res judicata in a subsequent suit against the United
States" or against the Commissioner.' These decisions appear to rest
on no substantial basis, and should be overruled if the doctrine of res
judicata is to be retained at all in federal tax cases. The notion that a
judgment in a suit involving a collector is not res judicata in a subsequent
tax suit against another officer or against the United States rests upon a
I1. 1934), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 73 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); cf.
Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cis. 279, 44 F. (2d) 1IC20 (1930),
cert. denied, 283 U. S. 835 (1931) (Board's decision based on stipulation); Castle v.
United States, 17 F. Supp. 515 (Ct. Cis. 1937) (same); National Fire Ins. Co. V. United
States, 72 Ct. Cis. 663, 52 F. (2d) 1011 (1931) (Board's decision on a different issue) ;
B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass. 1937) (Board's decision
"at least prima facie evidence"). But cf. Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. United
States, 82 Ct. Cis. 646, 13 F. Supp. 762 (1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 32 (19356),
discussed at p. 1337, supra.
114. Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933); Donald v. J. J. White
Lumber Co., 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Bindley v. Heiner, 33 F. (2d) 489
(V. D. Pa. 1930); Warren Mfg. Co. v. Tait, 60 F. (2d) 982 (D. Md. 1932); Greylocl:
Mills v. White, 55 F. (2d) 704 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd, 63 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 1st,
1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 760 (1933); Pankratz Lumber Co. v. Poe, 16 A. F. T. R.
1103 (WV. D. Wash. 1935); Worm v. Harrison, 374 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv.
119234 (N. D. I1. 1937).
115. Second Nat. Bank v. Woodworth, 66 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Bertel-
sen v. Vhite, 58F. (2d) 792 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933) ;
cf. Hilton Lumber Co. v. Grissom, 70 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), cert. denied,
293 U. S. 613 (1934).
116. Garcin -% Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1027 (1931), remanded on stipulation of
parties, 79 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (transferee case).
117. Art MAetal Const. Co. v. United States, 82 Ct. Cis. 666, 13 F. Supp. 756 (1936);
Guettel v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 725 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
118. Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33 (1919); Joplin Ice Co. v. United States,
15 A. F. T. R. 1018, (IV. D. Mo. 1934), aff'd on otler grounds, 87 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A.
8th, 1936); see Petroleum Iron Works Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cis. 646, 650, 5 F.
Supp. 558, 559 (1934); McKinney v. United States, 62 Ct. Cis. 180 (1926), cert.
denied, 273 U. S. 716 (1926). The judgment is binding in a subsequent suit against
the same collector. Donald v. J. J. White Lumber Co., 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934).
119. Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 303 (1932); Brooklyn Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 659
(1936); cf. Gus Sun Booking Exchange Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 1197 (1928).
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dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes in Sage v. United States.12° The opinion
proceeds entirely on the ground that the action against the collector is
"personal" in its nature. This theory has been consistently followed in
other situations: An action against a collector may not be continued
against his successor in office, 2' while on the death of a collector, the
action may be revived in the name of his personal representative.122 It
will serve no purpose here to go into the historical justification for all
this. It seems clear that, whatever the basis may have been in the past
for regarding the action against a collector as "personal,"' 23 that basis
has now quite gone. Cessat ratione, cessat le.%. Since the Sage case was
decided, it has been established that the right to sue the collector may
be taken away by Congress in a proper case without substituting any
other remedy. 1 24 And in George Moore Ice Cream Company v. Rose,125
the Supreme Court specifically held that where the collector acted pur-
suant to an assessment - as is almost invariably the case - the United
States becomes a party to the judgment as a matter of law. A few
extracts from the opinion are sufficient to show the real inapplicability
of the reasons advanced in the Sage case:
"The Collector did act under the directions of the Secretary of
the Treasury, or other proper officer of the Government in the col-
lection of the tax . . . His duty being imperative, he is protected
by the command of his superior from liability for trespass, and is
120. 250 U. S. 33 (1919). That it was a dictum has recently been pointed out in
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Harrison, 18 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N. D. Ill. 1937).
121. Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U. S. 1 (1921); Union Trust Co. v. War-
dell, 258 U. S. 537 (1922).
122. Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608 (1902). We have currently such quaint pro-
ceedings as tax suits in which the Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company is defendant,
and is, in form, cast in judgment. See American Chain Co. v. Hartford-Connecticut
Trust Co., 86 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). In this case the District Court granted
judgment for over $600,000, plus interest. 11 F. Supp. 770 (D. Conn. 1935). It seems
unlikely that the Trust Company's shareholders were much exercised over the prospect
of having to meet this loss.
123. There seems to have been little basis in substance for this view, even in the
past. When the Government was briefing George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289
U. S. 373 (1933), it could point to no recorded instance where a collector had been
denied a certificate of probable cause. But cf. Toledo Railways & Light Co. v. Mc-
Maken, 17 F. Supp. 338, 345 (N. D. Ohio, 1936).
124. Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409 (1930); United States v. Jeffer-
son Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U. S. 386 (1934) ; cf. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 87 F. (2d)
773 (C. C.A. 5th, 1937), aff'd, U. S. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1937; Butler v. Carney, 17
F. Supp. 133 (D. Mass. 1936).
125. 289 U. S. 373 (1933). The decision was that the REvENuE AcT Or 1924 § 1014,
allowing recovery of taxes though paid without protest, was applicable to a suit against
a collector, although the taxes had been paid without protest before the enactment of the
section, so that the collector was subject to no liability under the law in force at the
time of payment.
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entitled as of right to a certificate converting the suit against him
into one against the Government . . . One does not speak of prob-
able cause when justification is complete . . .
"A suit against a Collector who has collected a tax in the fulfil-
ment of a ministerial duty is today an anomalous relic of bygone
modes of thought. He is not suable as a trespasser, nor is he to pay
out of his own purse. He is made a defendant because the statute
has said for many years that such a remedy shall exist, though he
has been guilty of no wrong, and though another is to pay. There
may have been utility in such procedural devices in days when the
Government was not suable as freely as now. They have little utility
today, at all events where the complaint against the officer shows
upon its face that in the process of collecting he was acting in the
line of duty, and that in the line of duty he has turned the money
over. In such circumstances his presence as a defendant is merely a
remedial expedient for bringing the Government into court.!"2
In the light of these more recent determinations of the nature of the
liability of the collector, the decision in the Sage case should no longer
be followed. 27 The Court has not hesitated to overrule its decisions in
other circumstances. The dictum in the Sage case and its progeny should
be relegated to the same limbo.
In other cases, no one representing the Government was a part), in
the earlier litigation. In this situation, it might be supposed that it would
indeed be clear that the prior decision is not binding on the Government.
A decree of a state court approving a receiver's report showing
certain losses is not sufficient to establish these losses for tax purposes.228
A surrogate court decree approving an executor's account, though ac-
cepted by the estate tax division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in
fixing the amount of the federal estate tax, is not res judicata as to the
value of stock included in the account when the issue arises in a sub-
sequent income tax case." And the decision of a state court, based on
126. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 381-83 (1933). Citations
are omitted.
127. In Second Nat. Bank v. ,Voodworth, 66 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933),
holding a judgment in favor of the United States conclusive in a subsequent suit against
the collector, the court held that the Moore case made the Sage case inapplicable. This
decision was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Tait v. Western Maryland
Ry., 289 U. S. 620, 627 (1933). It is perhaps not without significance that the Moore
case and the Western Marland case were decided in the same month. See also the
remarks of the court in Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 87 F. (2d) 773, 779 (C. C. A. 5th,
1937), aff'd, U. S. Sup. Ct, May 17, 1937.
128. Austin v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 373 (App. D. C. 1935); Guaranty State Bank
v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 543 (1928).
129. Carnrick v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 12 (1930); Nicholson v. Commissioner,
21 B. T. A. 795 (1930) ; Jackson v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 470 (1935) ; cf. Fidelity
& Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 52 F. (2d) 293 (W. D. Ky. 1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 66 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
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the verdict of a jury, that a bequest was valid as a charitable gift, does
not conclude the issue whether the bequest is deductible for estate tax
purposes.' 30 These results seem fairly clear until they are turned around.
If the state court had found that there was no loss in the bank cases
or that the charitable gift was not valid, it seems very likely that the
Government would have found in the state decision strong and perhaps
conclusive support for the denial of the deduction claimed.'
The difficulty is emphasized when the recent decision in Blair '. Com-
inissioner".2 is recalled. In that case there had been a prior decision by
the Circuit Court of Appeals in a tax case between the same parties
holding that the trust of which the taxpayer was a beneficiary was a
spendthrift trust and that the assignments made by the taxpayer were
invalid. Then there was a state court decision to the contrary to which
the Government was not a party and could not have been a party if
it had sought to be. When the issue arose again in a tax case con-
cerning a subsequent year, the prior tax decision was held no longer
applicable, while the intervening state court decision was found to be
conclusive. "The supervening decision of the state court interpreting
that law in direct relation to this trust cannot justly be ignored in the
present proceeding so far as it is found that the local law is determina-
tive of any material point in controversy." s Thus we are thrown back
squarely to the problem of the effect of state law on federal tax ques-
tions. This is a very elusive topic, the analysis of which does not seem
yet to have been completed, and which we cannot undertake to examine
here.'"
130. City Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 719 (1929); Eagan v. Commis-
sioner, 43 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). But cf. Smith v. Commissioner, 78 F.
(2d) 897 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rav. 844. Of course, it might be
said that the question whether a gift is charitable so as to be valid under state law is
not necessarily the same as the question whether it is charitable within the deduction
provision of the estate tax law. The concept, however, is an almost uniformly accepted
one, and it is doubtful if such a distinction really exists. See Eagan v. Commissioner,
supra, at 883.
131. Cf. Eagan v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 881, 883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), where
the court intimated that a state decree against the trust would have been conclusive:
"The Revenue Act did not intend to except trusts which could not lawfully take effect,
but only those which can and do become operative." But see Olympia Veneer Co. v.
Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 892. 909 (1931), where a state decision that certain pay-
ments were dividends was considered not conclusive in the federal tax proceeding.
132. 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937). See pp. 1321-22, supra.
133. 57 Sup. Ct. 330, 332 (1937).
134. Cf. Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279 (1931); Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U. S. 103 (1932); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 78 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), (1936) 49 HAv. L. REV. 844; Barton, The
Effect of State Laws on Federal Tax Laws (1932) 10 TAx MAG. 11; Comment (1934)
34 COL. L. REv. 526.
In the Freuler base the federal statute expressly referred the tax question to the
"order governing the distribution" [REvEzuE ACT OF 1921 §219 (d)], and that this
[Vol. 46: 13201344
RES JUDICATA IN FEDERAL TAX CASES
The Blair decision does, however, seem susceptible to certain com-
ments. In the first place, whatever may be the effect of a state court
decision where there has not been a prior determination of the question
between the parties now before the court, there had been such a prior
decision in the Blair case. Though the application of the rule of res
judicata there might shut out relevant light, that is the nature of the
rule of res judicata. The Court does seem to have been a little summary
in its handling of this question. Moreover, it is not wholly clear that
the state court decision is the ultimate word on the construction of the
trust instrument. The issue in that case was between the trustees, the
beneficiary, and the assignee. If a controversy should arise between a
trustee in bankruptcy and another beneficiary of the trust, perhaps in
another appellate district or eventually before the state supreme court,
the trustee in bankruptcy no doubt would contend that the property
passed to him because the prior state decision established the trust in-
terest as property which the bankrupt "could by any means have trans-
ferred."' 3  If the prior temper of Illinois courts in spendthrift trust
cases is any test, he is very likely to be met with the answer that this
was res inter alios acta. Which, then, of the state decisions vill be con-
clusive in federal tax matters? And, in the meantime, is not the fact
that the state decision first rendered makes the property subject to the
claim of the trustee in bankruptcy sufficient to cast grave doubt on it
as a final determination of the law of the state? For the time being,
however, it seems to be established that a federal tax decision will not
be res judicata in a subsequent case between the same parties if there
is an intervening state court decision that is regarded as controlling
under the nebulous rules governing the effect of state law on federal
tax questions.
There is a third group of cases in which a prior decision involving one
party may be urged as binding in the later case of another taxpayer-cases
in which the two taxpayers were both parties to the same transaction,
and different aspects of the transaction are presented in subsequent tax
controversies. In Hall v. Commissioner,50 the petitioner had transferred
stock to a corporation in exchange for other stock, and the question was
whether any taxable gain was realized from the exchange. In a pre-
made the order of the state court binding in determining the federal tax question, vas
a basis of the decision. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35, 44-45 (1934). No statute
making such an express reference to the state court decision was involved in the Blair
case.
135. BANKRuPTcY AcT § 70 (a) (5), 30 STAT. 544, 565 (1893), 11 U. S. C. § 110 (a)
(5) (1934); cf. Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U. S. 427 (1916); see
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRiFT TRrsTs (1936) §§ 356-61.
136. 31 B. T. A. 125 (1934); cf. Farrell v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 265, M, 271
(1937).
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vious case it had appeared that the corporation had sold the stock it had
received, and its gain had been computed on the transferor's basis, on
the theory that the transaction was a tax-free exchange under the reor-
ganization provisions of the Revenue Act. The transferor's contention
that this decision was conclusive in his case was rejected. A similar
result was reached in an estate tax case in which the Commissioner con-
tended that a transfer had been made in contemplation of death, though
in computing the gain from a later sale of the same property he had
taken the position that it was not in contemplation of death.137 Situations
of this sort have been presented in different guise in a few other cases.""
Where several persons take part on the same side of a transaction, as,
for instance, where there is a syndicate of several members, or where
the same issue arises separately as to the beneficiaries of the same estate,
a decision in the case of one, though persuasive, is not conclusive in the
case of another."3"
It is a natural reaction to say that in these circumstances the Govern-
ment should not be allowed to blow both hot and cold with respect to
the same transaction. It is difficult for the layman, at least, to see that,
with our system of throwing every doubtful point into litigation, there
are situations in which the Commissioner must take inconsistent posi-
tions until the Supreme Court has settled the issue one way or the
other. If the Commissioner makes up his mind as to what he thinks is
right and follows that conclusion consistently in early cases on both sides
of the question, the Supreme Court may eventually decide that his solu-
tion was wrong, with the net result that both classes of taxpayers pay
no tax when only one should have gone free. Only by taking a position
in favor of the Government on both sides of the question until the issue
137. See Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 704, 713 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
138. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A.
1st, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 700 (1933) ; Bone v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 1010
(M. D. Ga. 1931) (a decision in a corporation's case that deductions for officers' salaries
were excessive was held not controlling in favor of an officer's contention that the
excessive portion received by him was taxable as a dividend) [cf. William S. Gray &
Co. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cls. 480, 35 F. (2d) 968 (1929)]; Bateman v. Commis-
sioner, 34 B. T. A. 351 (1936) (the first decision determined that a corporation was a
personal service corporation, but did not establish the amount of its income, and thus
was held not conclusive on the latter point in a case involving a shareholder's tax).
139. Gwin v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 393 (1928), aff'd on this point sub nom.
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U. S. 548 (1932); Appeal of Suhr, 4 B. T. A. 1198 (1926); Appeal of Walz,
4 B. T. A. 1202 (1926). But cf. Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A.
267 (1931), where the petitioner in the second case was a party in the first proceeding.
Questions as to the identity of the parties in the two cases are also presented in the
cases involving suits on bonds. [see pp. 1331-32, supra], and in the cases involving trans-
feree liability [see pp. 1347-51, infra).
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is finally settled, can the Commissioner protect the revenue. 4 0 For this
reason the cases holding that a position taken in one case does not bar
an inconsistent position in the other case seem right, though there is
obvious difficulty if the inconsistent positions in fact lead to a double
tax in the same transaction.
IV. TRANSFEREES
A special instance of the problem of parties is presented in proceed-
ings brought against persons who have received a transfer of property
from the original taxpayer,14 1 for where there has been a previous
determination of the transferor's liability, the conclusive effect of this
determination in the later proceeding against the transferee may come
into question. Under Section 311 of the Revenue Act of 1936,12 the
"liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property of a taxpayer,
in respect of the tax," may be asserted by deficiency notice; the transferee
then has an option to pay the tax or to seek a redetermination from the
Board of Tax Appeals. The statute thus provides a means of proceed-
ing against the transferee substantially the same as if he were the primary
taxpayer. The transferee proceeding may be originated either before or
after the final determination of the tax liability, of the transferor.
Since the statute provides a means for enforcing the "liability, at law
or in equity, of a transferee," a first approach to the problem might be
an examination of the extent of the liability of a transferee before the
provision was enacted. There seem to have been few, if any, cases in
which the Government had proceeded by suit against a transferee after
140. The difficulty is far from imaginary. Consider, e.g., the position which the
Commissioner was forced to take by the decisions in Warner v. Walsh, 15 F. (2d) 367
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926), United States v. Bolster, 26 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923),
and Allen v.* Brandeis, 29 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. Sth, 1928), and the resulting confusion
and loss of revenue when the Supreme Court decided that these cases were wrong and
that the Commissioner's first position had been correct. Helvering v. Butterworth,
290 U. S. 365, 369 (1933). The Commissioner's efforts to salvage something from
the situation are shown in such cases as White v. Stone, 78 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 1st,
1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 596 (1935), cert. granted, 56 Sup. Ct. 610 (1937). Simi-
larly, the Commissioner might have been subject to criticism for laxness in the per-
formance of his duty if he had consistently taken the position that the transfer in-
volved in Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), and in Com-
missioner v. Igleheart, 75 F. (2d) 151 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), had not been made in con-
templation of death.
141. See PAUL AN! MERTExs, FEDERA. INcomE TAXATION (1934) §§ 4629, 5327.
142. This provision is the same as that contained in the RaE,;u- Acrs o 1923, 1932,
and 1934 § 311. It originally appeared, in slightly different form, as § 230 of the R-v-
EN=u Acr oF 1926. The constitutionality of the original section was sustained in Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931).
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obtaining a judgment for taxes against the transferor. 143 But outside of
the tax field there are many cases holding that in a proceeding by a
judgment creditor of a corporation, the judgment, if obtained without
fraud or collusion, is conclusive against a transferee or shareholder in
fixing the liability of the corporation. 4 There is apparently no reason
why this rule should not be applicable when the creditor's claim is for
a tax. 145 Doubtless because of the paucity of authorities on the precise
issue, the Board has approached the problem with very little reference
to the earlier cases.
While the proceeding under Section 311 is not the Government's ex-
clusive remedy against transferees, 146 most of the cases raising the
question of res judicata have arisen before the Board of Tax Appeals,
and have involved the conclusive effect of prior decisions of the Board.
In a number of cases, the Board has held that its decision made on the
merits in reviewing a deficiency determined against the transferor is
conclusive as to the transferor's tax liability in a subsequent proceeding
involving the transferee.' 47 The prior decision is binding not only on
143. In none of the cases cited by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U. S. 589, 592, n. 2 (1931), in which the United States proceeded by suit against
transferees, had there been a previous judicial determination of the tax liability of the
transferor. This was also true in Leighton v. United States, 289 U. S. 506 (1933), and
the cases there cited.
144. Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652 (1914) ; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237
U. S. 413 (1915); Royal Arcanum V. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); Matin v. Auge-
dahl, 247 U. S. 142 (1918) ; Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed. 747 (C. C. A. 1st, 1899) ; Amer-
ican Nat. Bank v. Supplee, 115 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 3d, 1902); Martin v. Wilson,
120 Fed. 202 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903); Champagne Lumber Co. v. Jahn, 168 Fed. 510
(C. C. A. 7th, 1909); Levy v. Equitable Trust Co., 271 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ;
cf. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935); see 6 THompsoN, CORbRATIONS (3d
ed. 1927) §§4981-96. In Ball v. Warrington, 108 Fed. 472 (C. C. A. 3d, 1901), and
Bissit v. Kentucky River Nay. Co., 15 Fed. 353 (C. C. D. Ky. 1882), the prior judgment
was refused conclusive effect on the ground that it was obtained by fraud or collusion.
This circumstance, arising chiefly where the creditor is in control of the corporation,
would not be likely to appear in federal tax cases.
145. See Rogge, The Transferee of a Delinquent Taxpayer (1928) 39 Mxcu. L. REV.
39, 71-72.
146. Leighton v. United States, 289 U. S. 506 (1933).
147. Woodley Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 253 (1929); Jahncke
Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 837 (1930), appeal dismissed without written
opinion, C. C. A. 5th, Feb. 10, 1933; Duval v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1357 (1931),
aff'd, 57 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Carney v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 721
(1931); Garcin v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1027 (1931), remanded on stipulation of
parties, 79 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Green v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 719
(1932); cf. Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 533 (Ct. Cis. 1936). In
Garcin v. Commissioner, supra, the prior decision was by a United States district court;
in all of the other cases the prior decision was the Board's.
Although the transferee is usually a stockholder who has received a liquidating dis-
tribution from a c.orporation, the rule applies to other situations, as in Drake v. Coin-
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the transferee, but also on the Commissioner. If the Board determined
that there was no deficiency due from the transferor, the Commissioner
may not proceed further against the transferee.""8 And the decision with
respect to the transferor is conclusive equally as to the merits of the
transferor's tax and on the question whether it was barred by limita-
tions.'"0
There are a number of situations, however, in which the Board has
concluded that a prior decision involving the transferor did not preclude
a re-examination of the merits of the tax in the transferee's proceeding.
Where the transferor's appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
there is no decision on the merits which can be invoked by either party
in a subsequent controversy over transferee liability.'-' As to this there
can be little controversy, for there was, in effect, no appeal to the Board.
In other situations in which the Board has refused to give conclusive
effect to a prior decision against a transferor, the result is more doubtful.
The Board has determined that the decision in the transferor's case will
not be conclusive against the transferee where the transferor's petition
was dismissed on its own motion,'"' or where the decision in the trans-
feror's case was based on consent or on stipulation.e -
These decisions seem difficult to support. Once the transferor has
appealed to the Board, the decision which the Board may make becomes
the final determination of the transferor's tax liability for the year in
question, subject only to direct review by the circuit courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court. The Board's jurisdiction becomes exclusive
upon the filing of the petition. 15 3 When its decision becomes final, it
determines the tax liability of the transferor whether the decision be
after full hearing or on stipulation or consent. The transferor's tax lia-
bility thus becomes fixed, and the transferee's liability is to pay the tax
missioner, 30 B. T. A. 475 (1934), in which the transferee vas the beneficiary of the
transferor's estate.
148. Woodley Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 253 (1929); Carney v.
Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 721 (1931); cf. American S. S. Co. v. Wiclkire Spencer
Steel Co., 8 F. Supp. 562 (S. D. N. Y. 1934), discussed at n. 160, infra.
149. Green v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 719 (1932). But cf. American S. S. Co. v.
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 8 F. Supp. 562 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
150. Gay v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 580 (1934) (transferor's petition filed by an
unauthorized officer); cf. American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.
T. A. 247 (1932), aff'd, 68 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (transferor's petition signed
by transferee and hence ineffective). In the latter case the point was assumed rather
than decided.
151. Wayne Body Corp. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 401 (1931), modified on an-
other point, 22 B. T. A. 1207 (1931), modified on another point, 24 B. T. A. 524 (1931);
Stanley Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 705 (1932).
152. Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 186 (1935); cf. Bateman
v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 351 (1936).
153. See note 40, supra.
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due from the transferor,5 4 regardless of the basis upon which the trans-
feror's tax was determined. Many of the cases involve corporations with
only a few stockholders where the transferee was throughout the real
party in interest and where the transferor's case was controlled by the
same counsel who appeared for the transferee. 55 There is here an addi-
tional reason for giving conclusive effect to the determination in the
transferor's case, for it is well settled that a person in control of liti-
gation is bound to the same extent as an actual party to the proceeding.'
And where reliance is placed on a decision of the Board based upon
stipulation or consent, there is generally the added sanction of contract.'
The Board has not been wholly consistent in this group of cases. In
Garcin v. Connissioner,"' the decision against the transferor was a
default judgment obtained in a federal district court. The Board held
this binding on the transferees. It would seem that for this purpose a
decision of the Board based upon consent or stipulation should be at
least as effective as a default judgment of a district court."'
Here, as elsewhere, nice questions may arise as to the exact scope of
the conclusive effect of a prior decision. This issue was presented in
American Steamship Company v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Company.'0 °
In the transferor's case the Board found no deficiency because certain
waivers of the Statute of Limitations, signed by the transferee without
the transferor's authorization, were invalid as to the transferor. In a
proceeding involving the transferee's liability, the District Court agreed
that the decision of the Board would be binding on the validity of the
waivers if that question were presented, but held that, having signed
the waivers, the transferee was estopped from asserting their invalidity.'
There was "no identity of issues in the two cases."'1 2 Thus the transferee
154. That is, to the extent that he has received assets from the transferor or is other-
wise subject to liability. See 5 PAUL AND MERTENS, FEDERAL [.cOWmE TAXATION (1934)
§ 46.41.
155. This was the case in Wayne Body Corp. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 401
(1931) cited supra note 151; Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 186
(1935).
156. See Souffront v. La Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U. S. 475, 487 (1910);
1 FREEMAN, JUDGMEXTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 432-33.
157. See the cases in note 96, supra.
158. 22 B. T. A. 1027 (1931), remanded on stipulation of parties, 79 F. (2d) 993
(C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
159. Where the petition in the transferor's case had been filed with the Board under
the 1924 Act, the Board's decision had only prima facie effect, and accordingly is not
conclusive in the transferee's case. Stegeman v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 949 (1932).
160. 8 F. Supp. 562 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
161. The decision on estoppel was based on Lucas v. Hunt, 45 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930). Cf. McPherson v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
162. 8 F. Supp. 562, 566 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
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may be liable although no tax is due from his transferor. In another
case,'6 the Board determined on stipulation that no tax was due from
a transferor because it was a personal service corporation. The result of
this was to make the corporation's income taxable to its stockholders
much as if it had been a partnership." In a subsequent proceeding in-
volving the tax liability of one of the stockholders for the income of
the corporation, the Board held that the prior decision was not conclusive
as to the amount of the income - in part because the earlier case had
been disposed of on a stipulation. Although this ground appears objec-
tionable, the result seems right. The determination that the transferor
was a personal service corporation and thus not subject to tax was not
a decision on the issue of the amount of its income taxable to the share-
holder.
V. PENALTIES
The question of the interrelation of criminal proceedings and of civil
penalties for fraud may arise in various situations. Under Section 145
of the Revenue Act of 1936, any person who "willfully fails" to pay
any tax due, or to make a return, or to keep records, or to supply in-
formation, is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined up to $10,000,
and imprisoned up to one year. Any person "who wilfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any tax" is guilty of a felony and may
be subjected to a fine of the same extent and imprisonment up to five
years.1 In each case the Statute provides that the criminal penalty shall
be "in addition to other penalties provided by law." The penalties which
are collected administratively are chiefly three: a penalty running.up to
twenty-five per cent "In case of any failure to make and file return
. . . unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and
not due to willful neglect;" '"G a penalty of five per cent of a defi-
ciency. 7. imposed "If any part of the deficiency is due to negligence,
or intentional disregard of rules and regulations but without intent to
163. Bateman v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 351 (1936).
164. See REVENUE AcT OF 1918 §§ 200, 21S (e) ; cf. Rnmam Acr oF 1917 § 209.
165. Corresponding provisions have appeared in the REVMuE Acrs OF 1932 and 1934
§ 145, and in the REvENUE Acr OF 1928 § 146. There were additional criminal provi-
sions in the REVEN E AcT OF 1926 § 1114, and in the RmEuE Acr or 1924 § 1017.
166. RE;vENuE Acr OF 1936 § 291. A similar provision was contained in the Rnv-
ENUE AcT OF 1935 § 406, and, somewhat different in form, in the REMVUE Acts OF
1928, 1932, and 1934 §291, apparently originating in the RLMvua AcT or 1918 § 250 (b).
For the Treasury's views as to the application of the section see U. S. Treas. Reg. 94,
Art. 291-1.
167. REvENuE Acr OF 1936 § 293 (a). This provision, included in the R wEVEU Acts
OF 1928, 1932, and 1934 § 293 (a), finds its genesis in the somewhat different provisions
of the REVENUE Ac OF 1918 § 250 (e), and in Rm STAT. § 3176 (1875).
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defraud;"1 8 finally, and most important, the "fraud" penalty of fifty
per cent of the amount of any deficiency is added to the tax "if any part
of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax."' 1 0
It is clear from this r~sum6 that the criminal and administrative penal-
ties are not imposed in exactly the same terms, however plain it may be
that facts which would show a "willful" attempt "to eva'de or defeat
any tax" would ordinarily be sufficient to show "fraud with intent to
evade tax." How far, then, will a determination under one of these
provisions operate to bar a proceeding under another? Clearly the pay-
ment of penalties in addition to the tax will not bar a subsequent criminal
prosecution, 170 for there is no previous adjudication, and thus no basis
for the application of res judicata. Moreover, as has been pointed out,
the criminal penalty is in terms imposed "in addition to other penal-
ties provided by law." The suggestion that there is an invalid double
punishment for the same offense is subject to the answer given in the
cases discussed below where a penalty is allowed after a successful
criminal prosecution.
Where the taxpayer has been subjected to fine or imprisonment in
a criminal prosecution, the contention has sometimes been made that a
fraud penalty may not thereafter be imposed. This penalty, it is said,
constitutes a second punishment for the same offense, and creates the
double jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. This argument
has been uniformly rejected, whether the judgment against the defendant
in the criminal proceeding has been based upon a plea of guilty, 1 ' or
upon the verdict of a jury"' - for, it is said, Congress intended to
impose cumulative penalties. In Hanby v. Commissioner, 1 8 the con-
clusion was put in these words:
"It is manifest that Congress intended to impose upon such unlaw-
ful and fraudulent conduct as that of the taxpayer in this case not
168. For an interesting discussion of the "negligence" and "failure to file return"
penalties, see Kent, The Treasury Point of View (1935) 13 TAx MAG. 511.
169. REVENUE ACT OF 1936 § 293 (b). The same provision appeared in the REVENUE
AcTs OF 1928, 1932, and 1934 § 293 (b), the REVENUE AcTs OF 1924 and 1926 § 275 (b),
and the REVE.NUE AcTs OF 1918 and 1921 § 250 (b). It has been applied in many cases.
For general discussions of the fraud penalty, see Brabson, Fraud and Good Faith i;n
Tax Cases (1936) 14 TAX MAo. 3; Gardner, The Compromise of Federal Taxes and
Penalties (1935) 13 TAx MAG. 635; Jackson, Changes in Treasury Tax Policy (1934)
12 TAX MAG. 342, 345; Kent, Treasury Tax Problems (1934) 12 TAx MAG. 527, 529.
170. Slick v. United States, 1 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924); cf. United States v.
McCormick, 67 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 662 (1934).
171. McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 247 (1933); Epstein v. Commis-
sioner, 34 B. T. A. 925 (1936).
172. Hanby v. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) ; Castle v. United
States, 17 F. Supp. 515 .(Ct. Cis. 1937) (suit to recover a penalty imposed by the
Board pursuant to a stipulation).
173. 67 F. (2d)'125, 130 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
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only a punishment by fine and imprisonment through criminal prose-
cution . . . but also the added penalty . . . Under such circum-
stances it has been held that the statute does not impose a second
punishment for the same offense, but that the several penalties are
parts of a whole which is not satisfied by the imposition of a part."
Though there is a certain element of casuistry in this way of putting it,
the result seems justified. The only substantial difficulty is that result-
ing from United States v. La Franca,7 4 and that is one easily disposed
of on the ground that the case was based on the construction of statutes
having no application to the tax situation. Although prosecution does
not bar the imposition of the penalty, the record of the criminal case
is not conclusive in establishing the fraud upon which the penalty is
based. Where the conviction was based upon a plea of guilty, the record
of that plea "is receivable as an admission to be given weight according
to the circumstances."'176
The more difficult situation is presented when the criminal prosecu-
tion has resulted in an acquittal and the Commissioner thereafter under-
takes to assert a fraud penalty. Three cases have involved such penalties
after an unsuccessful criminal prosecution, 77 but only one of these ap-
pears to have raised the question squarely.'7  This is the Mitchell
case; the taxpayer was acquitted on an indictment based on Section
174. 282 U. S. 568 (1931). This was a proceeding to recover certain taxes, which
the Court concluded to be penalties, imposed for the conduct of a liquor business. The
defendant had previously been convicted for the same acts in a criminal proceeding.
The prior conviction was held a bar to the imposition of the penalties.
175. The tenuous nature of the La Franca decision is apparent from the concurrent
decision in Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U. S. 577 (1931),
where forfeiture of property used in violation of liquor revenue laws was upheld,
although its owner had previously been convicted in a criminal case of a violation of
the same laws. There should also be noted a certain element of suspicion in the appli-
cability of any case arising under the liquor laws during the prohibition era; various
cases during this period, it seems, might have gone the other way if prohibition laws
had not been involved. Cf. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932).
176. McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 247 (1933).
177. Hanby v. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); Scharton v.
Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 459 (1935), dismissed without written opinion, C. C. A. Ist,
April 29, 1936; 7Mitchell v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 1093 (1935), rc,'d on this ques-
tion, C. C. A. 2d, May 10, 1937.
178. In the Hanby case, the acquittal was on a charge of filing false amended returns
for 1917 to 1919, but the penalty was asserted for filing false original returns. Hanby v.
Commissioner, 67 F. (2d) 125, 129 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) ("the issue here involved, of
fraud in the original returns, is wholly distinct."). Query, could the Government have
maintained a criminal prosecution for the filing of the original returns after the acquit-
tal with respect to the amended returns?
In the Scharton case, the indictment vas held barred by the Statute of Limitations.
United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518 (1932).
19371 1353
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
146(b) of the Revenue Act of 1928, but the Board upheld the impo-
sition of fraud penalties under Section 293(b) of the same Act. In
reaching this result, the Board said:
"A careful study of the two sections convinces us that they are
basically different in character and were enacted for wholly different
purposes. The language of the two sections differs widely, and con-
templates situations which may require entirely dissimilar proof. ' 170
There would be little reason to doubt the correctness of this conclusion
were it not for the case of Coffey v. United States,180 which the Board
cites only by inclusion in a quotation."8 ' That case involved a proceed-
ing brought by the United States to forfeit certain property for a vio-
lation of the internal revenue laws. The proceeding was held to be
barred by the prior acquittal of the owner of the property in a prose-
cution under the same laws.
The Coffey case has been distinguished many times, but it has never
been overruled or expressly qualified. There is reason to conclude, how-
ever, that it should not be applied to penalties under the present revenue
laws. First, as a practical matter the issues are different in the two
proceedings. In the criminal case the question before the jury is, should
this defendant go to jail? In the penalty proceeding the issue involves
money only. It seems plain that, rightly or wrongly, a jury might be
influenced in such a situation by factors which should not be considered
by the tax tribunal.' Secondly, as a legalistic matter the burden of per-
suasion in the two cases is different. In the criminal case the Govern-
ment must prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," while in the penalty
proceeding the proof must be by "clear and convincing evidence."' 88
The Coffey case was distinguished in part on the ground of differences
in burden of proof in Stone v. United States.' The merits of these
179. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 1093, 1136 (1935), ree'd on this ques-
tion, C. C. A. 2d, May 10, 1937.
180. 116 U. S. 436 (1886).
181. In dissenting, two members relied on the Coffey case.
182. This point is made in the note on the Mitchell case in (1936) 36 COL. L. REV.
1006.
183. Kerbaugh v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 1014 (1934), aff'd, 74 F. (2d) 749
(C. C. A. 1st, 1935); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 1093, 1129 (1935), reeld
in part. C. C. A. 2d, May 10, 1937. In another situation, res judicata was said not to
apply because of differences in the burden of proof. Peck v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A.
402 (1936).
184. 167 U. S. 178, 188 (1897). A recent case making the same distinction as that
in the Stone case is United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 13 F. Supp. 614, 616
(E. D. Mo. 1936). To the same effect is Sourino v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 309
(C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 491 (1937) (proceeding to cancel a
naturalization certificate held not barred by a prior acquittal on the charge of fraud
in obtaining the naturalization). See (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 1006, 1007.
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arguments do not appear to be wholly disproved by the recent reversal
of the decision on this point in the Mitchel case.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the cases thus reviewed demonstrate anything, it is "human reluc-
tance to let controversial issues stay settled." 's Although the Supreme
Court has made it clear that res judicata applies to tax cases, there has
been much more litigation in the field since the decision than before.
There is room, at least, to consider the rule in operation and to examine
the scope within which it can operate with maximum utility.
It should not be forgotten that "Res judicata is a principle of peace.""'
It is a rule which forecloses and shuts out truth, which may result in
"the perpetuation of error," 18 7 and which can therefore be justified only
to the extent that it brings a compensating advantage. "Relief from re-
dundant litigation"1"88 may be such an advantage, but on this basis the
principle of res judicata can be justified only so far as it does in fact
eliminate repetitious lawsuits. Our examination of the cases shows, per-
haps, that there are some circumstances in which litigation over the
question whether res judicata is applicable or not, may well present more
difficult questions than would be involved in re-examining the merits
of the case itself. To this battleground res judicata brings no peace.
It should be confined to the area within which it will in fact prevent
further litigation, and within which its application may become so clear
that complicated litigation over questions of its scope will be brought
to a minimum.
Further difficulties with the rule of res judicata arise out of the pro-
cedural system for the review of federal tax decisions. Review by the
Supreme Court in a tax case is never a matter of right; it is always
discretionary. And either the taxpayer or the Government may incur
a decision in an early litigation plainly contrary to the law as it is even-
tually established by the Supreme Court- and this though every effort
has been made to obtain the highest Court's decision. The error may be
irretrievable as to the particular case then litigated.' But it is difficult,
185. The phrase is from Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar PraC-
tices in Federal Taxation (1935) 48 Hnv. L. REv. 1281, 1331. The authors continue:
"Laymen more than lawyers, and lawyers perhaps more than judges, but even judges
to some extent, are moved by the appeal of afterthought and afterdiscovery. It is
indeed a problem to set acceptable boundary lines between the normal and very neces-
sary rule of repose and the scattering concessions to people with hard cases."
186. Holmes v. Donald, 84 F. (2d) 188, 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
187. Appeal of Union Metal Mlfg. Co., 4 B. T. A. 287, 283 (1926).
188. Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620, 624 (1933); Greenbaum v.
United States, 17 F. Supp. 83, 86 (Ct. Cis. 1936)..
189. See Art Metal Const. Co. v. United States, 82 Ct. Cis. 666, 13 F. (2d) 756
(1936). Consider also the situation of the taxpayer who lost in Steedman v. United
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at best, to defend the doctrine if it is extended to require perpetuation
of mistake after error has been clearly shown. This is a very real
danger. It has already occurred to the detriment of both the taxpayer'90
and the Government. 191 It was with such decisions in mind that the
Special Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Bar Associa-
tion made its last report. 92 The Committee, referring to the Westrn
Maryland case, said:
"As a result of this decision, if the taxpayer secures a decision of
a court, even though not the Supreme Court, with respect to a par-
ticular income tax question which recurs in later years, he becomes
entitled to the benefit, or subject to the burden, of the decision, even
though it is later determined in other cases that the decision is wrong.
This causes a lack of uniformity in the application of the law among
the taxpayers and this result does not seem to be required by any
fundamental principle involved in the doctrine of res adjudicata.
The year litigated is of course dosed by the judgment, but there
seems to be no reason why the taxpayer should be treated more or
less favorably in a later year than the law as finally determined war-
rants, merely because he had litigation about some previous year's
taxes. This point deserves further study to determine whether or not
the principle of the Tait vs. Western Maryland Railway Company
decision as applied to subsequent taxable years should be changed
by legislation."' 193
Although the Committee suggests the possibility of legislation, it is
not clear that this is the best or the necessary way to solve the problem.
States, 63 Ct. Cls. 226 (1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 528 (1927), when the Supreme
Court subsequently decided in Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 (1930) that he had
been right all the time; or of the taxpayer in Means v. United States, 69 Ct. Cls. 539,
39 F. (2d) 748 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 849 (1930), if the Supreme Court had
gone the other way in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933). Legislative grace
is not an effective remedy, though it seems the only one available in such cases. See
note 39, supra.
190. See the decisions in Waller v. Commissioner, 40 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 5th,
1930), ccrt. denied, 282 U. S. 889 (1930), and in Herold v. Commissioner, 42 F.
(2d) 942 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), which were rejected by the Supreme Court in a later
case involving the same instrument. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 (1933). See also
Hitchcock v. Commissioner, 44 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), where the taxpayer
was protected only by a rehearing [49 F. (2d) 1078 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931)] granted
after the Supreme Court's decision in Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931).
191. Cf. Pryor & Lockhart Development Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 687
(1936), where an earlier decision in Commissioner v. Pryor & Lockhart Development
Co., 70 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934)-a petition for certiorari had been filed in
vain, 293 U. S. 574 (1934)-was held to be res judicata for a subsequent year, although
intervening decisions of the Supreme Court (e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S.
344 (1935)] make it clear that the first decision was wrong.
192. (1936) 61 A. B. A. Rep. 821.
193. Id. at 831.
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Statutes often seem to breed disputes rather than to solve them. Res
judicata is a judge-made doctrine, and the courts can mould it to fit
the need and the circumstances. There is a place for res judicata in our
tax system, but the extent of its proper application does not follow from
the fact that we have it or ought to have it.
With these considerations in view, we may hazard a statement of the
limits within which res judicata can operate with maximum advantage,
keeping in mind that, unless the limits are clear, questions of the appli-
cation of the rule are likely to provoke as much litigation as the rule
is intended to eliminate. There is reason to believe that res judicata
will be of maximum benefit in federal tax litigation if it is applied under
the following circumstances:
1. A final judgment of a court or a decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals with respect to an income tax for any taxable year, or an estate
tax on any estate, should bar any further proceeding with respect to
the same taxable year or the same estate.
2. Where different taxable years are involved in the two cases, res
judicata should be applied much more narrowly than has been true in
some cases in the past. Not only should it be confined to issues which are
identical in the two cases, but the word "identical" should be rigidly
construed to apply only to situations where the applicable statute is
unchanged and all of the controlling facts occurred before the earlier
of the tax years. Examples of such issues are the determination of
March 1, 1913 value, the construction of a will or other instrument, and
other situations in which the question may properly be thought of as
static. An issue should not be regarded as "identical" if it is merely
similar, as where the question is whether an organization was a trust
or association in successive tax years or was a personal holding cor-
poration, or where the issue concerns different transactions or the con-
struction or legal effect of different instruments, however similar the
transactions or instruments may be. The ordinary rule of stare decisis
is sufficiently rigid to provide for these situations; the extension of res
judicata to them leads only to continued litigation as to its application.'"
3. Even where the issues are identical in the sense just indicated,
a decision with respect to one tax year should not be regarded as res
judicata with respect to a subsequent year when an intervening con-
trolling decision has established the error of the first decision. It is
194. This paragraph is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Tait
v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U. S. 620 (1933). The Court there referred to the rule
as applying to the "identical question" [id. at 624] ; and the question there raised was
of the sort here suggested as "identical." It is not necessary to modify or qualify any
Supreme Court decision; it is necessary only to fix the scope of the res judicata rule
a little more narrowly, perhaps, than in non-tax cases, because of the inherent recurring
nature of tax liability.
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not overlooked that the application of this rule would involve some close
and difficult questions. That could be met to some extent by the adop-
tion of a presumption in favor of Supreme Court decisions and against
the application of res judicata. In any event, to meet and decide these
questions would be better than to perpetuate a decision that has been
established to be error. The function here is analogous to that of a
bill of review, but without the limitations of that obscure device.
4. Finally, the application of res judicata should be wholly inde-
pendent of the identity of the party who appears on the Government
side of either case- whether it be the United States, the Commissioner,
or a collector.
Development along these lines would not eliminate all res judicata
questions. There would seem to be some room to hope, though, that it
would tend to minimize such disputes as have followed in the wake
of the Western Maryland decision -to the end that res judicata may
come to be in actuality as well as in theory "a principle of peace."
